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Censorship isan odious enterprise. We
oppose censorship and classificationby
governments because they are alien to
the American tradition of freedom.
Much of this nation's strength and
purpose isdrawn from the premise that
the humblest of citizens has the
freedom ofhis own choice. Censorship
destroys this freedom ofchoice.'

n 200 1,prisoners in Pennsylvania challenged
a prison policy prohibiting them from watching films
rated R,X, or NC- 17. The prison policy was designed
to implement the Zimmer Amendment, 2 which
denies funding to any prison that shows R, X, or
NC- 17 films.' After the District Court denied the
prisoners' claims in a cursory opinion, the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit remanded for a more
fact-sensitive analysis.
Ostensibly, the eventual disposition of this
case may appear rather unimportant. Many may
question why much attention should be paid to
whether prisoners should have the right to view

certain films; however, there are actually several
important questions raised by this case and other
cases dealing with the ZimmerAmendment. Initially,
courts have traditionally held that the MPAA ratings
lack any clear standards and that they are legally
unenforceable. If a court upholds the provision of
the Zimmer Amendment that prohibits funding to
prisons showing R, X, or NC-17 films, it will
essentially be saying that the MPAA ratings can be
used by certain governmental agencies to censor
films. This is diametrically opposed to the central
purposes of the MPAA ratings: establishing selfregulation and curbing government censorship.
Despite federal courts' gradual recognition
of their role in vindicating prisoners' rights in the
1960s, the courts are increasingly deferring to the
government when crafting prison policies. The
Zimmer Amendment, and the Pennsylvania prison
policy based on it,have presented the federal courts
with an opportunity to play a leading role again in
vindicating prisoners' rights.4 Both the Zimmer
Amendment and the Pennsylvania policy were
apparently passed to punish prisoners, despite there
being no factual findings that the laws actually
advanced any penological interests. While the

District Court failed to reach the right result on its of the doctrine is provided by the case of Ex parte
initial review, it now has the opportunity on remand Pickens In that case, a prisoner in Alaska challenged
to hold that the government's sole reliance on the his imprisonment in an overcrowded cell, with a
MPAA ratings was
improper and that the
regulations in question
were unconstitutional.
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Turner v. Safley. Part II

considers the purposes
behind the Zimmer
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Amendment and looks
at the district and
appellate court rulings in
the Pennsylvania prisoners' case, Wolf v.Ashcroft Part
III looks at the history of the MPAA ratings and cases
dealing with their legal enforceability. Finally, Part IV
applies Turner's test to the ZimmerAmendment and
the Pennsylvania policy prohibiting R,X, and NC- 17
movies from being shown in prison, ultimately
concluding that the Zimmer Amendment is
unconstitutional because it impermissibly relies on
the MPAA ratings.

There was a time, not so very long
ago, when prisoners were regarded
as 'slave[s] of the State" having 'not
only forfeited [their] liberty, but all
[their] personal rights'
From the drafting of the Constitution until
the 1960s,6 federal courts applied the "Hands-Off"
Doctrine, under which the courts refused to hear
prisoners' claims.7 The central tenet of the "Hands
Off" doctrine was that courts should not interfere
with the treatment of inmates in prison unless they
are illegally confined.8 Perhaps the best illustration

coal stove presenting "the ever present possibility
of fire" and no method of escape.' 0 The Court
recognized that "the place [was] not fit for human
habitation" and that cramming so many prisoners
into such a small and dangerous cell constituted a
"fabulous obscenity."' Nonetheless, consistent with
the Hands-Off Doctrine, the court held that "the
punishment now suffered by the petitioner, while
inexcusable and shocking to the sensibilities of all
civilized persons, is not of such nature as... to justify
discharge of the petitioner at this time." 2
When reviewing prisoners' rights claims at
the time when the "Hands Off" doctrine was still
in place, courts advanced five general reasons given
by courts for failing to question prison policies: "(I)
separation of powers; (2) federalism; (3) judicial
incompetence in prison administration; (4) fear of
undermining prison disciplinary schemes; and (5)
'3
desire to avoid a flood of litigation.'

In the 1960s, several federal district courts
began to acknowledge that prisoners retained at
least some Constitutional rights. More generally,
courts simply recognized that "the penal system
[had] failed to achieve its public protection, crime
"' 4
reduction, and offender rehabilitation objectives '
This recognition initially resulted in district courts
reconsidering how they dealt with prisoners' rights
and then eventually intervening in more cases
dealing with prisoners' rights.'

~
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The United States Supreme Court first gave
prisoners' claims legal support by unofficially
7
revitalizing 42 U.S.C. § 198316 in Monroe v. Pape.1
Section 1983 allows civil actions for government
deprivations of constitutional rights. In Monroe,
the Court found that federal courts were obligated
to hear claims that state officials were violating
federal rights. 8 Even before the Supreme Court
explicitly acknowledged that prisoners could bring
claims under section 1983, state and federal courts
had considered prisoners' claims based on the
Court's opinion in Monroe. 9
In the 1964 case of Cooper v. Pate, 20 the
Court recognized that prisoners could bring claims
under section 1983, explicitly legitimizing prisoners'

the Court responded to this pressure by recognizing
that inmates could bring certain claims that their
rights had been violated by the government.

There is no iron curtain drawn
between the Constitution and the
prisons of this country.'
In acknowledgment of lower court decisions,
the Supreme Court in 1974 recognized that
prisoners' rights are not categorically eviscerated
when they pass through prison walls. In Wolff v.
McDonnell, the Supreme
Court

specifically

rejected the State's
contention

suits. " In Cooperthe Court addressed a prisoner's
claim that he had been denied "permission to
purchase certain religious publications" and other
unspecified privileges.2 Although the Court did not
reach the merits of Cooper's claim, it reversed the
district court's dismissal of Cooper's complaint.3
Additionally, the Court recognized that prisoners
retain some rights while in prison and that courts
can hear cases where prisoners allege their rights
4
have been unlawfully violated.

The Court's decision in Cooper was
prompted by increased pressure from two primary
sources. First, prisoners themselves were becoming
more proactive. 5 For instance, Black Muslims
launched a number of attacks against the
discriminatory treatment they endured because of
their religious practices. 2 Second, whereas inmates
were previously forced to proceed pro se,they now
were supported by new public and private funding
for legal representation for prison litigants.27 Rather
than deciding to continue to deny inmates' claims,

that

"prisoners in state
institutions are wholly
without the protections
of the Constitution and
the
Due
Process
2
9
st
g
Clause.'"
In Pell v. Procunier, 0
Justice
Marshall's
concurrence established
the "retained rights"
doctrine that would
eventually be adopted by the Court." The Court's
holding reflects the doctrine that a prisoner"retains
all the rights of an ordinary citizen except those
expressly, or by necessary implication, taken from
him by law.""2 This "retained rights" doctrine has
guided the Court's analysis for the last several
decades."
The Court filled in the substance of this
doctrine by establishing the standard of review for
prisoner's rights cases in Procunier v. Martinez, 4 the
first prisoner's rights case the Supreme Court
decided on its merits." The case concerned the
constitutionality of two prison regulations. The first
regulation restricted inmates' personal
correspondences, 6 while the second regulation
categorically prohibited lawyers from using law
students and legal paraprofessionals to interview
prisoners.17 Instead of focusing on the prisoners'
rights, the Court determined that the regulations
unconstitutionally infringed upon the First
Amendment rights of non-prisoners to communicate

freely with the prisoners.18 As such, the Court
invalidated the regulations using a strict scrutiny
standard of review,3 9finding that the regulation was
not narrowly tailored to advance a compelling
governmental interest.
Later that year, the Court made clear that a
much more deferential standard applies when a
prison regulation impinges solely upon a prisoner's
rights. In Pellv. Procunier,4°the Court considered the
constitutionality of a prison regulation restricting
4
inmates' ability to be interviewed by the press. '
Initially, the Court found no violation of the First
Amendment rights of the press because the press
has the same right of access to prisoners as the
42
general public.
Unlike in Martinez, Pell solely focused on the
rights of prisoners. Rather than adopting Martinezs
searing strict scrutiny standard, the Pell decision held
that prison policies impinging solely on prisoner's
rights were to be judged under the more deferential
reasonableness standard. 43 Using this standard, the
Court should then engage in an ad hoc balancing
test, measuring inmates' rights against the legitimate
penological interests of the state.44 If a court finds
that the state reasonably balanced individual rights
against state interests in enacting a prison policy the
4
policy should be held to be constitutional. 1

violated their right to marry under the due process
clause.
The Court held that prison regulations
violating prisoners' constitutional rights are valid if
they are reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests. 3 Several factors are relevant to determine
whether a regulation is reasonable:
First, there must be a 'valid, rational
connection' between the prison
regulation and the legitimate
governmental interest put forward
to justify it....A second factor.. .is
whether there are alternative means
of exercising the right that remain
open to prison inmates....A third
consideration is the impact
accommodation of the asserted
constitutional right will have on
guards and other inmates, and on
the allocation of prison resources
generally .... Finally, the absence of
ready alternatives is evidence of the
reasonableness of a prison
regulation. 4
Applying this test, the Court upheld the
regulation of inmate correspondence but struck
down the regulation limiting marriage. Specifically,
the
correspondence regulation was "content
V~
neutral, it logically advance[d] the goals of
institutional security and safety... and it [wa]s not
For over a decade, the Court decided an exaggerated response to those objectives' 5
prisoner's right's cases under Pell's deferential Conversely, the regulation of marriage was not
balancing test.47 However, lower courts' application based on a legitimate penological interest, and the
of the Pelltest resulted in inconsistent reasoning and prison's policy was an exaggerated response. 6
results. 48 Because of this lack of consistency across
This new test is substantially more
circuits, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in deferential to the interests of the state than Pelfs
the Eighth Circuit case, Turner v.Safley.49
balancing test. Under Pell, courts would weigh
Turner involved two class action suits against prisoners' rights directly against the state's
Missouri prison regulations."0 The first regulation interests. However, under Turner, prisoners' rights
prohibited correspondence between inmates at are completely subordinated to penological
different penal institutions unless "the classification/ interests. The Turner test thus means that if the
treatment team of each inmate deems it in the best state can cite a rational relationship between its
interest of the parties involved."'5 The inmates policy and the interests it seeks to serve, the court
challenged this regulation on the ground that it need not even look at the nature of the right
abrogated FirstAmendment free speech rights. The involved. This has caused Justice Brennan to label
second regulation prevented inmates from marrying Turner's test "categorically deferential." 7
unless they received "permission of the prison, Nonetheless, despite serious questions about
and.. .such approval should be given only'when there Turner's wisdom, 8 it remains the controlling
are compelling reasons to do so" 52
' The prisoners constitutional standard for prison policies.
challenged this regulation on the ground that it

In January of 1995, Congressman Dick
Zimmer first introduced the Zimmer Amendment,
which I will refer to as the Amendment, also known
as the "No Frills Prison Act," 9 as part of the
Republican "Contract with America." One of the
provisions of the Amendment is that "none of the
funds appropriated or otherwise made available to
the Bureau of Prisons shall be used to provide.. .the
viewing of R,X, and NC- 17 rated movies, through
whatever medium presented....,60 Congress initially
enacted the Amendment as section 611 of the
Omnibus BudgetAct of FiscalYear 1997 and has re6
enacted the Amendment every year. '

filed by Jere Krakoff, an attorney with the
66
Pennsylvania Institutional Law Project in Pittsburgh.
The prisoners argued that certain R-rated films such
as "Schindler's List;' "Amistad$" "Glory," and "The
English Patient"' should not be banned in prison.67
In defense of their censorship of these films, the
government pointed to several legitimate penological
interests supporting a categorical ban: "that the
movies posed security risks ... that the absence of

such movies deterred people from committing
crimes, [and] that denial of such movies fosters
rehabilitation"

68

The prisoners' case was heard before the
United States District Court for theWestern District
of Pennsylvania after a federal magistrate hearing.69
The Magistrate had advised that the court should
not make a decision under Turner until an evidentiary
record was developed. 70 In a four page opinion

The basis for the Amendment was a belief
that .'[p]risonsshould be places of detention and
punishment'prison perks undermine the concept ofjails
as a deterrence. They also waste taxpayer money....
Zimmer felt that some criminals believed that life in
jail was an acceptable alternative to the "real" world
because of a perceived
increase in available
luxuries. 63 The purpose
of the Amendment,
therefore, was to

contradicting the recommendation of the federal
magistrate, District Judge Sean J. McLaughlin found
for the government, 7' finding that legitimate

penological interests supported the government's
policy. However, the District Court did not state
which interest it found legitimate or why it found

eliminate these luxuries.

Zimmer felt that the
Amendment achieved
this goal by requiring
federal prisons to
provide the minimal

A
I

amount of luxuries (i.e.,

basic food, clothing, and
other
necessities)
without denying them

p

v

constitutional rights or
m
causing disciplinary
problems because of
harsh
prison
64
conditions.
In order to comply with the Zimmer
Amendment, a federal penitentiary in McKean,
Pennsylvania, instituted a policy that "[n]o movies
rated R,X, or NC- 17 may be shown to inmates."'
Inmates objected to the categorical nature of this
prohibition and to the Zimmer Amendment. A class
action suit on behalf of federal prisoners was soon

the interest to be legitimate. 7 The District Court
also declined to engage in a substantive analysis of
whether the government's policy was rationally
related to a legitimate interest. Instead, the District
Court dismissively claimed to adopt the "common
sense" approach to the Turner reasonableness test
as had been accepted by the Third Circuit7 3 in
Waterman v.Farmer.74
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Turner's final three

factors without applying
any of the factors to the

d

Senprisoners'
. Tthis
0I n-

case.8 2 The

Third Circuit rejected

approach, stressing
that a successful
application of Turner must
include an analysis of
each of Turner's four
prongs.83
According to

The prisoners appealed the decision, and
Judge Marjorie Rendell delivered the opinion in which
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
District Court.7 The Third Circuit first found the
District Court's opinion "deficient in that it never
stated or described the interest purportedly served
by the prison policy, nor did it determine whether
'76
the interest was neutral and legitimate.

TheThird Circuit also rejected the 'common
sense' approach taken by the District Court in finding
that the prison policy was rationally related to
legitimate penological interests. The Third Circuit
held that "while the connection may be a matter of

theThird Circuit, the first
Turner factor can be
dispositive only in favor
of a prisoner challenge, for "if
the connection is
arbitrary or irrational, then 'the regulation fails,
irrespective of whether the other factors tilt in its
favor."4 Turner's first factor is thus only "foremost"
in cases where the prison policy is truly arbitrary."
Judicial reasoning that satisfies the first factor in no
way "subsum[es] the rest of the inquiry "'8 6 and a
court"must then proceed to consider the remaining
Turner factors in order to draw a conclusion as to
the policy's overall reasonableness.18 7 Thus, the

ZimmerAmendment could not be upheld by a court
solely because it satisfies Turner's first factor.

common sense in certain instances ... there may be

situations in which the connection is not so apparent
and does require factual development

"' 77

Ostensibly

questioning the legitimacy of the government's
interest in crime deterrence by banning R and NC17 movies, the Third Circuit asked whether it "is a
matter of common sense, as was argued here, that
prohibiting movies rated R or NC-17 deters the
general public from committing crimes, lest they be
sent to prison where they are not permitted to
watch R-rated movies?"7 8 The simple answer was
that the Court was "not so sure:' 79 stressing that
the District Court had several questions left to
answer on remand. Specifically, the District Court
would have to "describe the interest served [by the
policy], consider whether the connection between
the policy and the interest is obvious or attenuated
- and thus, to what extent some foundation or
evidentiary showing is necessary" ' °
The Third Circuit further held that the
District Court inappropriately applied the Turnertest.
The District Court merely held that the prison policy
satisfied Turner's first prong' and then referenced
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Movies have been regulated in the United
States for more than a century. The first recorded
incident of censorship occurred in 1894, when
"Dorolita's Passion Dance", an "erotic dance"
kinetoscope, 8 was withdrawn from circulation. 9 In
1908, NewYork City mayor George McClellan closed
all local nickelodeons on Christmas." Films were
often censored under the rubric of other reasons.
For example, McClellan's act was primarily motivated
by both moral values and anti-Semitism, as Jewish
theater owners would be hurt the most by the
shutdowns. 9' A few weeks later, agroup of NewYork
clergymen attempted to prevent theater owners
from showing films on Sundays. 92 This growing

tension between religion and politics led to a number
of private protests. Finally, the People's Institute in
NewYork City,a liberal-reformist group, announced
a plan to establish a censorship board in March
1909. 93

simple, originated and conducted for profit, like other
spectacles, not to be regarded ... as part of the press
of the country, or as organs of public opinion*"' "
While the Court recognized that movies could be

Religious

industry members were
simultaneously meeting
to create a selfregulation system at the
national level,9 4 called
the National Board of
Censorship."I

u r

n

The Board first

met on March 25, 1909,
and soon became
known for "reasonable

administration
of
content censorship.' 96
Despite the Board's
efforts, many people still
protested the modified
movies. These protesters gained substantial political
power, and soon directed local police to "terrorize
exhibitors in defiance of the industry's self-regulatory
apparatus.'97 While some of these efforts were
organized by private citizens, several city and state
governments had also created censorship boards by
_

1911 .98

entertaining, it also cautioned that they are "capable
of evil, having power for it, the greater because of
their attractiveness and manner of exhibition."' 05
After the Mutual Film Corporation decision,
state legislatures promptly began considering how
to regulate the motion picture industry. By 1922,
legislatures in thirty-six states were considering bills

In response to these private organizers, allowing film censorship.10 6 That same year, the
industry members at a 1914 National Exhibitors' motion picture industry decided to take drastic selfConvention cited local censorship as theater owners' censoring measures to insulate its movies from local
most significant problem nationwide.99 At the same censorship. Thus, it formed the Motion Picture
time, it was becoming increasingly evident that the Producers and Distributors of America ("MPPDA"),
moderate National Board of Censorship lacked the the predecessor of the current Motion Picture
10 7
clout to prevent increasing grassroots activism." ° Association of America ("MPAA").
Consequently, the former National Board of
The MPPDA established the draconian Hays
Censorship reorganized itself as the National Board Office Production Code, 08
°which contained a strict
of Review and attempted to insulate the film industry set of rules preventing the showing of "immoral"
from local regulation.'
conduct on film. 09 The Code had many guidelines
This attempt was to no avail, as the Supreme long since forgotten in contemporary Hollywood:
Court made self-regulation by the film industry even "For example, open mouth kissing was prohibited; a
more difficult in Mutual Film Corporation v.Industrial man and woman in bed, whether married or not
Commission of Ohio.102 In Mutual Film Corporationthe had to keep one leg on the floor; verbal profanity
Court upheld an Ohio statute creating a censoring was not allowed; bad guys did not escape justice."'' 0O
board. Anyone desiring to show a film in Ohio had The Code was enforced by the Production Code
to screen the film before the board, which only Administration (PCA), an in-house agency connected
approved those films it found to be "of a moral, with California.' If a film contained "forbidden"
educational, or amusing and harmless character " '3 elements, the PCA would refuse to affix the film
The Court held that movies are not with the Production Code seal of approval."I2 While
protected as free expression under the First the Code system was voluntary, failure to procure a
Amendment; rather, movies are "a business, pure and seal essentially meant that a film would not be

released because the big studios would not distribute
films without the PCA seal of approval.' 3
Many complained that the Code "stifled
creativity" but that was exactly the point." 4 The
MPPDA was willing to
enforce strict self-

of the PCA and have some overturned, there was
no local appeals process. 2 4 Box office revenue

steadily declined for two decades because of this
external censorship. The Supreme Court then

imposed guidelines to
deter states from moving

forward with legislation
that would prevent
completed films from
being shown in different
parts of the country. On
this front, the Hayes
Code was largely
successful. By 1925, all
but one of the thirty-six states considering local
censorship withdrew their attempts, allowing Hayes
and the MPPDA to create national standards."I s
Twenty-three years later,the Supreme Court
would fundamentally change the way motion pictures
are made and distributed in the United States. In
U.S. v. Paramount Pictures," 6 the Court overturned
the Court's argument in Mutual Film Corporation that
movies were not protected by the FirstAmendment.
Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority, made
clear that"moving pictures, like newspapers and radio,
are included in the press whose freedom is
7
guaranteed by the First Amendment:"'
After Paramount filmmakers began violating
the Hayes Code standards." 8 In response, many
states began banning films that were not PCA
approved. However, based on Douglas' opinion in
Paramount, the Court proceeded to strike down
several state board bans of certain 'offensive' films.
The net result of these decisions was that state
censorship of films became virtually impossible." 9
Frustration at the state level resulted in a
concomitant increase in activism at the grassroots
level. 20 The reappearance of censorship at the local
level was especially troublesome because local movie
theaters need a positive relationship with the
community to survive.' Rather than upset the
community by showing prohibited films or
challenging the prohibitions in court, movie theaters
generally capitulated to the grassroots activism.' 22
This local censorship put the movie industry in a
worse position than when studios voluntarily
adhered to PCA guidelines because local censors
often targeted films that they had not even viewed.'23
Additionally,while filmmakers could appeal decisions

stepped in and decided two crucial cases in 1968
which allowed the MPAA to overhaul the ratings
system: Ginsberg v.NewYork and Interstate Circui, Inc.
v. City of Dallas.

2

In Ginsberg v. New York, 26 the Court
considered the constitutionality of a New York
statute criminalizing the sale of obscene material to
minors under the age of 17. The statute prohibited
sales of materials obscene to minors, even if the same
materials would not be considered obscene to
adults. 27 The Supreme Court upheld the statute on
the basis of"variable obscenity,the notion that a book
or film might be made available to adults that would
and should otherwise be banned for minors."' 28
That same day,the Court decided Interstate
Circuit, Inc. v City ofDallas. 29 In Interstate Circuit Inc.,
the Court held a Dallas censoring board decision
classifying the film "Viva Mira" as "not suitable for
young persons" to be unconstitutional.3 The Court
held that the standards used by the board to classify
films were too vague and that "[i]t is essential that
legislation aimed at protecting children from allegedly
harmful expression.. .be clearly drawn and that the
standards adopted be reasonably precise."''
However, Justice Marshall then immediately
cautioned that it was not the Court's place to draft
32
such legislation.
The MPAA read the Court's decision in
Interstate Circuit, Inc. as authorization to create a
narrowly drawn private ratings system applicable to
minors.' 33 The MPAA had already been undergoing
changes since 1966, when it appointed Lyndon
Johnson's assistant JackValenti as its third President.'3 4
Recognizing the need for self-classification to avoid
local censorship, Valenti initially auditioned the

Suggested for Mature Audiences ("SMA") rating to
allow studios to experiment with more controversial
topics. 3 ' Still, Valenti
never saw this rating as
anything more than an
"interim solution.'1

unsuitability of viewing by children.'1 4 Valenti

explicitly argued that the ratings' relevance pertained

36

After
1968,
Valenti had the legal
precedent necessary to
mobilize the

movie

industry into creating a
universal,
internal

S

classification procedure

that would largely
prevent local censorship.
Looking at Interstate
Circuit lnc.,Valenti thought that it 'said something
that had a seminal ring to it, and it rang like a twanging
wire through the whole fabric of viewing movies:
They said children could be barred from seeing
movies but no one could bar adults from seeing

only to minors: "Inherent in the rating system is the
fact that to those 17 and over, or without children,
' 45
the ratings have little if any meaning"
The MPAA ratings are enforced by the
MPAA-created
Classification and Rating
movies."' ' 3 7 Valenti disagreed with legal censorship Administration (CARA). CARA is a full-time board
via classification, but understood the importance of of seven members, and no qualifications are required
a responsible reputation for MPAA.138 After Interstate for board members to serve. 4 6 The Board reviews
Circuit Inc., Valenti had the authority to create a the film using four criteria - theme, language, nudity
voluntary self-classification system.'39 The MPAA and and sex, and violence. 147A majority vote is required
other film groups therefore created a new voluntary to set the rating, whether a G, PG,PG-13, R, or NC17 rating. 'I No one criterion is weighed more heavily
film rating system in November 1968."40
What this rating system is not about is than any other in arriving at a rating, but the MPAA
almost as important as what it is about. In his has come up with basic general descriptions of
personal statement accompanying the adoption of movies receiving each of the ratings. 4 9 While the
the new rating system, Valenti noted that "there is rating system is voluntary, the great majority of
'no valid evidence.. .that movies have anything to producers submit their films to CARA to be rated.5
The movie makers may make cuts based on
do with anti-social behavior."""' The system's
or they may appeal to the Ratings
CARA
suggestions,
against
letting
their
purpose, then, is to warn parents
children view a particular film. The ratings themselves Appeal Board. This board consists of twenty-four
do not censor or "even make a final evaluation on members of the MPAA, the National Association of
[the suitability of the film for minors]; except for Theater Owners (NATO), and the International Film
the X-rating, the parent's decision remain[s] the key Importers & Distributors ofAmerica (IFIDA).' 5 After
to children's attendance."' 4 Valenti particularly noted all sides present their case, the Board votes by secret
that the MPAA ratings should not be the final ballot and can reverse CARA's decision only by a
standard used by parents in determining whether two-thirds vote.' The movie industry's adoption of
their children should see a film. Instead, Valenti CARA immediately led to the decline, and ultimately
recommended the ratings as merely a starting point, the extinction, of all local censorship boards.5 3 While
asserting that parents should also read magazines the MPAA ratings have gone largely unchallenged in
and local newspapers to determine what films they the last three decades, three plaintiffs have
successfully challenged the constitutionality of the
feel are appropriate for their children.'4 3
This goal of parental notification is the only government's reliance of the ratings.

goal of the system, and "[t]he only objective of the
ratings is to advise the parent in advance so he or
she may determine the possible suitability or

The first case to challenge the MPAA ratings
was Motion PictureAssociation ofAmerica v Specter. "
Specter concerned a new amendment to
Pennsylvania's Penal Code.'55 In finding the
amendment unconstitutional, the district court noted
"that the Code and Rating Administration has... no
defined standards or criteria against which to
measure its ratings."'5 6 Instead, "[f]ilms viewed are
simply graded according to the individual reactions
of the viewing members."'5 7 Consequently, the
amendment was "patently vague and lacking in any
ascertainable standards... and the attempted
recourse to Association ratings [wa]s of no avail"'* 58
To some extent, Specter tells us little about
whether the prison policy in Wolf or the "No Frills

motion pictures as "...any motion picture which is
rated under the Rating Program of the Motion
Picture Association of America in a category
recommending that minors, unaccompanied by a
parent or guardian, be denied admission."''

62

When

a movie theater denied certain minors admission to
the R-rated "Woodstock" when accompanied by
adults, the minors challenged the ordinance as a prior
restraint on their First Amendment rights. 63 As in
Specter, the court found that,"if the Motion Picture
Association utilized any standards in reaching its
judgments as to what is an 'adult' movie, the
defendants are not aware of what these standards
are."64

Later,in Eastern Federal Corporation vWasson,
the Supreme Court of South Carolina considered a
law that levied twenty percent license tax on all
tickets sold to X rated movies. 6 ' The court found
that the law was
unconstitutional because
it

"impose[d]

no

guidelines for rating of
n films... leav[ing] the
determination solely to
I -the
discretion of the
MPAA.1' 1 66 In contrast to

Prison Act" is constitutional. Specter was a case

involving the restriction of First Amendment rights
and Pennsylvania's Amendment was thus subjected
to strict scrutiny. In contrast, under Turner, the state
only need prove that its regulation was rationally
related to a legitimate penological interest. At the
same time, the court was clear that, even with the
MPAA ratings, the Pennsylvania Amendment in
Specter lacked "any ascertainable standards " ' 9 It is
difficult to see, then, how the Pennsylvania law in
Wolf or the "No Frills Prison Act" - both relying
exclusively on the MPAA ratings - could even bear
a rational relationship to any legitimate penological
interests.
A month later, a Wisconsin District Court
reached a similar conclusion in Engdahl v. City of
Kenosha.16 0 Kenosha adopted an ordinance that
prevented individuals under age 18 from being able
to see "adult" films.' The ordinance defined 'adult

Wasson, a Wisconsin
District Court in Borger
v. Bisciglia67 upheld a
school district's reliance
on MPAA ratings when
the school denied a
student's request to see the movie "Schindler's List."
The school's principal, acting at the behest of several
teachers, initially sent a letter to the superintendent
requesting permission for teachers to be able to take
their students to the film during school hours. 168
The superintendent denied the request solely on
the basis that the MPAA had given the film an R
rating. The film therefore was "banned from the
curriculum" by school district policy. 69 After this
rejection, a student passed a petition around school
requesting that the school board reconsider its
decision.' 7° The School Board took no action, and
the students legally challenged the board's reliance
7
on the MPAA ratings.' '

Because Borger involved school
administration, the court used the rational basis test:
"whether or not the defendants' decision bore
a
reasonable relationship to a legitimate pedagogical
concern."' 72 The court initially found that the school

district presented a"legitimate pedagogical concern"
namely, to prevent its students from watching films
with excessive nudity, violence, and bad language.'73
The court found that reliance on the MPAA ratings
was rationally related to this interest, finding that "a
private organization's rating system cannot be used
to determine whether a movie receives
constitutional protection."'

74

IV. Applying the Turner Test
to Wolf v.Ashcro'TT

As opposed to the

decisions of other bodies, decisions made by school
boards about curriculum need only be rationally
related to a legitimate pedagogical concern.171 In
Borger, the court held that the school board had
presented enough evidence - such as MPAA press
releases - to establish that reliance on MPAA ratings
to ban films was rationally related to protecting
6
school children from obscene material."1
Borger still stands as the only case to uphold
the MPAA ratings against constitutional attack by
finding that the use of the ratings bore a rational
relationship to the government's purported interest.
Borger, however,is inapplicable to Wolf Superficially,
Borger seems highly similar to Wolf Both involve
challenges to policies banning films based solely on
their MPAA ratings. One of the movies cited by the
Wo/f petitioners -"Schindler's List" - was the same
movie at issue in Borger. Finally,the standard of review
in Borger- the rational basis test - is the same
standard that is applied to the prison policy in Wolf
What this comparison ignores, however, is that the
MPAA rating systems are intended only to guide

Turner's factors are (I) whether there is a
rational relationship between the prison policy and
relevant penological interests; (2) the alternative
means of expressing the right left open by the policy;
(3) the impact of accommodating the prisoners'
rights; and (4) potential alternatives to the prison's
policy. Turner never explicitly states the relative
importance of each factor or how courts should go
about implementing the test. Indeed, the Sixth
Circuit has noted that "Turner [does not]... require
a court to weigh evenly, or even consider each of
these factors."'

17

The majority of courts, however, have not
applied Turner's test as deferentially as the Sixth
Circuit. In Wo/f theThird Circuit remanded because
"the District Court did not applythe factors at all."' 8 °
The Third Circuit explicitly held that,"[o]n remand,
if the District Court again concludes that the first
factor is satisfied, it must then proceed to consider
the remaining Turnerfactors"' 8'
Previously,theThird Circuit did establish that
the first factor can be
dispositive, although all

the

factors

interrelated

are
and

incorporated into the
reasonableness' analysis.
In Waterman v Farmerthe
il

parents in deciding what films their children should
watch."' Any penological interest the government
has, therefore, has no rational relationship to using
the MPAA rating system when censoring movies
before an over- 16 audience. This admitted limitation
on the applicability and utility of the MPAA ratings
beyond situations involving children lays the
foundation for the argument that the Zimmer
Amendment's absolute reliance on the ratings fails
under Turner's rational basis test."8

~

Third Circuit held that,
"[a]lthough the factors

are intended to serve as
guides to a single reasonableness standard,'the first
factor looms especially large' because it 'tends to
encompass the remaining factors, and some of its
criteria are apparently necessary conditions."" 82
However, as Judge Rendell noted in Wolf,the first
factor is the most important only in the sense that
lack of a rational connection between the prison
policy and legitimate penological interests
automatically means the policy is unconstitutional.
Even if the state fulfills the first factor, the analysis

supporting that determination in no way subsumes
the rest of the inquiry.""

While some have suggested that the first
factor requires heightened scrutiny,most courts have
held that this factor is the equivalent of rational basis
review." 4 Ostensibly,this
deferential standard
lends credence to the

or fourth class mail" to be unconstitutional.8 In
the limited sense, the policy was 'rational' in that
such mail could contain illegal contraband. However,
this did not explain why the prison did not similarly
prohibit prisoners from receiving first and second
class mail.Thus, although the prison could prove that
bulk rate, third, and fourth class mail sometimes
contains contraband, it could not present any
evidence that such contraband appeared with any

validity of Pennsylvania's

law prohibiting prisoners
from viewing R, X, and
NC-17 rated films. An

-

incorrect analysis would
M
merely require that
Pennsylvania's ban on R
i
m
and NC-17 films be
P
rationally related to
some
legitimate
penological interest. In
this case, however, as in other prison censorship
cases, the analysis is much more akin to an equal
protection analysis.

(I) Morrison v. Hall"5 and the
Equal Protection Analysis
To satisfy the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the state must prove it has
rational reasons for its disparate treatment of R,X,
and NC- 17 films and G, PG, and PG- 13 rated films.
In Morrison, the Ninth Circuit found a prison policy
prohibiting prisoners from receiving"bulk rate, third,
or fourth class mail" to be unconstitutional. 8 6 In

the limited sense, the policy was 'rational' in that
such mail could contain illegal contraband. However,
this did not explain why the prison did not similarly
prohibit prisoners from receiving first and second
class mail.Thus, although the prison could prove that
bulk rate, third, and fourth class mail sometimes
contains contraband, it could not present any
evidence that such contraband appeared with any
less frequency in first or second class mail. 8 7
To satisfy the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the state must prove it has
rational reasons for its disparate treatment of R,X,
and NC- 17 films and G, PG, and PG- 13 rated films.
In Morrison, the Ninth Circuit found a prison policy
prohibiting prisoners from receiving"bulk rate, third,

less frequency in first or second class mail. 9 In order
to fulfill Turner's first factor, the prison would have
"to submit... evidence demonstrating a rational
connection between the postage rate at which a
publication is sent and the risk of contraband "'9 '
Similarly, in order for the Zimmer Amendment or
the Pennsylvania policy to pass constitutional muster,
the state must be able to prove a rational connection
between a film's MPAA rating and some legitimate
penological interest.
Judge Rendell (the Third Circuit judge who
remanded Wolf v.Ashcroft),the history of the Zimmer
amendment, and the ZimmerAmendment itself seem
to indicate that the Amendment's main purpose is
to create a harsher prison environment. However,
banning certain films may not actually create a
harsher prison environment.A recent comprehensive
study of film profits determined that PG films are
more than twice as likely to gross at least $25 million
domestically than R-rated films.'9 Further,the study
also found R-rated films are less profitable on average
than G, PG, and PG-13 films.'
Movie studios
recognize that PG and PG- 13 movies have a greater
potential to yield greater profits, and thus edit movies
with the highest earning potential so that they are
not rated-R. Many movies, therefore, that remain
rated-R are actually those with limited commercial
prospects. While there might be arguments to the

contrary, neither those
drafting, nor those
defending, the legislation
in question
have
presented any evidence
that prisoners prefer R-

rated films. Without
such evidence, there is
no reason to disrupt the
general rule that people,
as well as prisoners, on
average prefer to see PG
and PG-13 movies
instead of R-rated
movies.
According to
the District Court in
Wolf, the second
potential purpose of the

c

a

l

A
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ban on films rated R,
NC-17, or X is to
facilitate the rehabilitation of prisoners. 93 The
argument here isthat prisoners exposed to excessive
sex and violence in R,X, and NC- 17 rated films may
remain desensitized to pernicious behavior. However,
CARA "does not rate for quality or lack of it" when
giving a film a MPAA rating.'94 A movie with an
excessive amount of violence will be given an Rrating, whether the movie glorifies violence or
condemns it. Undoubtedly, a state can rationally
argue that an R-rated movie will stunt a prisoner's
rehabilitation by presenting images that glorify drug
use and violence. However, PG- 13 films may also
glorify violence, and R-rated films may present antiviolence messages. For instance, Rob Cohen's PG13 rated "XXX" and Stephen Spielberg's "Indiana
Jones and the Temple of Doom" (the film which led
to the somewhat arbitrary creation of the PG- 13
rating after Spielberg's intense lobbying to the MPAA)
contain numerous scenes of excessive violence,
which the audience is supposed to applaud, while
Terrence Malick's R-rated "The Thin Red Line" is
anti-violence, showing the pernicious effects of the
Battle of Guadalcanal on nature and man alike.
Sometimes, many PG- 13 movies can leave a
worse impression on viewers than R-rated films. A
war film with an R-rating such as "Glory" can show
the viewer in graphic detail the atrocities that
resulted from the Civil War. A similar war movie
with a PG- 13 rating would contain less violence, but
the viewer would be left with the impression that

war is less devastating and that violence has minor
consequences. However, even if there is some
connection between the MPAA ratings and the state's
penological interests, an absolute ban would still
constitute an exaggerated response, and run counter
to Turner

(2)The Prison Policy Must Not
Be An "Exaggerated Response"
Under Turner, a prison's policy must not be
an "exaggerated response" to the behavior it wishes
96
to proscribe."S For instance, in Bazzetta v.McGinnis,1
a state passed a law preventing former inmates from
visiting current prisoners. The Sixth Circuit found
that the state had asserted a legitimate penological
interest: "the prevention of disruption by exconvicts"' 9 However,the state impermissibly reacted
to this danger by categorically prohibiting all former
inmates from making non-contact visits.' 98 Because
this policy prohibited all visits without individualized
determinations of danger, many benign visits were
also prevented. The law was therefore held to be
unconstitutional, as it was an impermissible
''exaggerated response" to the potential problems
associated with visits by ex-convicts.199
The absolute ban on all R, X, and NC- 17
rated films constitutes a similarly exaggerated
response. Some may well argue that certain films
hinder the rehabilitation of certain prisoners and
lead to antisocial behavior. Although unlikely, a

-j

potential prisoner might avoid committing a crime
because these movies are banned in prison, making
the prison experience less enjoyable. However, many
films that have neither effect are banned under this
blanket policy. While a prison policy does not require
an exact fit between means and ends, absolute
reliance on the amorphous MPAA ratings is a
particularly ill-fitting solution because MPAA ratings
are irrelevant to adults.

Court did not even reach the Turnerfactors because
of its finding that no right was violated.
Based on the analyses in these cases, it is
clear that petitioners challenging the Zimmer
Amendment cannot simply argue that the right at
issue is their specific right to view R,X, and NC- 17
movies (and not some broader right) and that this
right is categorically precluded by the Amendment
to the extent that it'prohibits all R,X, and NC- 17
movies in prison. Instead, courts have found that
the right must be viewed more expansively; it cannot
be defined solely according to the items that the
regulation excludes. 09 Unfortunately, though,
accordingto at least one Circuit court, the Supreme
Court has never articulated a clear method for how
to define the right at stake. 10

Turner's second factor asks courts to look
at whether alternative means of expressing the right
in question remain open to prisoners. Courts have
(2) Broader Exclusions Lead to
developed several sub-factors when applying this
Fewer Alternatives
factor: defining the right broadly, looking at the
broadness of the exclusion, focusing on the right to
Despite this narrow interpretation of Turner's
receive information, and holding that violation leads second factor, the Court's analysis in Thornburgh v.
2°
only to increased scrutiny.
Abbote l indicates that absolute reliance on the MPAA
ratings is improper. Thornburgh involved a
(I) Defining the Right Broadly
constitutional challenge to a prison policy allowing
The first part of the analysis of Turner's prison officials to exclude any incoming publications
second factor is defining the prisoners' rights. In they felt would undermine institutional security."'
Turner and its progeny, Thornburgh v.Abbotthe U.S. However, under the policy,the warden had to review
Supreme Court held that" the right' in question must each publication separately, and could not simply
3 The Court
be viewed sensibly and expansively."2' In Thornburgh, create a list of excluded publications.21
the Court upheld regulations giving prison officials was especially "comforted by the individualized
the power to reject incoming publications they nature of the determinations required by the
thought jeopardized institutional security 02 because regulation" and cautioned that "[a]ny attempt to
officials banned only certain publications, allowing a achieve greater consistency by broader exclusions
significant number of publications to be sent and might itself run afoul of the second Turnerfactor, i.e.,
received. 3
the presence of 'alternative means of exercising the
Using the same reasoning in O'Lone v.Estate right' in question.'2 1 4
ofShabazz,204 the Supreme Court examined a policy
The policy in Wolf or the Zimmer
preventing prisoners from attending a specific Amendment should be treated no differently than
religious ceremony because of the amalgam of the policy in Thornburgh. Ostensibly, both create
religious practices already available to the inmates.205 blanket prohibitions on R,X, and NC- 17 rated films
In addressing this issue, first, the Court looked to without requiring or even allowing prison officials
the fact that during non-work hours there remained to make individualized determinations about specific
a near absolute right to congregate for prayer and films. In this sense, Wolf is similar to Kikumura v.
discussion.2 0 6 Second, the state provided an imam Turner,2 15 where a prison enacted a blanket ban on
whom prisoners could freely see.20 7 Finally,the state all Japanese language publications. In Kikumura, the
made special arrangements for Ramadan, and offered court found this policy to be unconstitutional in part
alternative meals whenever the prison served because it categorically prohibited a class of
pork.100 After examining these three separate factors, publications without the individualized analysis the
the court ultimately found no absolute violation of Supreme Court found essential in Thornburgh."'
the prisoners' right to free exercise of religion. The

(3) The Right to Receive
Information
While it seems clear that the absolute
prohibition in the ZimmerAmendment isoverbroad,
the question of how to define the right in question
remains unanswered. The right could be construed
as "the right to receive information,"'17 as it was in
Kikumura. Under this definition, the justification for
finding that the prisoners' right to information was

many of the best historical films receive R ratings,
meaning that prisoners are prohibited from seeing

2
them under current policy.

However, to simply argue that prisoners are
being denied the right to information would undercut
the impact of movies on society. An individual can
read about the Holocaust, but that same individual
can be confronted with shocking visual depictions
of the horrors of Nazi Death camps in an entirely
different manner by watching "Schindler's List."
Because any
film
portraying the horrors

J~n
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of a pernicious historical
event is likely to receive
an R rating, under
current policy, prisoners
are being denied the
unique opportunity to
vicariously experience

these events and further
what
understand
occurred. While reading
a book about history

gives the reader some
understanding, actually
violated would be the converse of the Ninth Circuit's seeing historical events recreated gives the viewer
reasoning in Morrison v.Hall ' In Morrison,the Court an entirely different perspective.
reviewed the constitutionality of a prison policy that
(4) Violation Leads Only to
prevented prisoners from receiving magazines in bulk
Increased Scrutiny
rate, third, and fourth class mail. The court struck
the policy down and rejected the argument that
No single Turnerfactor is dispositive. When
2 19
visual media are the equivalent of print media,
a court finds that the second factor has been violated,
reasoning that the two cannot be conflated because the regulation is not necessarily "presumptively
prisoners have such low literacy rates. 2 Visual media unconstitutional" Instead, the reviewing court must
are thus inadequate alternatives to printed words simply look at the policy's justifications with
222
because they do not allow prisoners to learn the "increased scrutiny'
literacy skills necessary to succeed upon their
reintegration into society.
The converse to this analysis should apply
with equal force. If prisoners cannot read, then their
The "ripple effect" refers generally to an
only method of learning about an event of historical
importance may be through viewing a movie. effect that occurs when accommodation of the right
Illiteracy may constructively prevent these prisoners in question would negatively impact other prisoners
from learning about historical events through the and make the jobs of prison officials more difficult.
written word. Further, only films with extreme Unfortunately,courts have implemented Turner's third
depictions of violence may be able to accurately factor in conflicting and often antithetical manners.
portray the horrors of the Holocaust, as in Some circuits have held that Turners third factor can
"Schindler's List", or of the Civil War, as in "Glory." only support upholding the prison's regulation. If
Films with less graphic violence often water down accommodation would negatively impact prison
such pernicious events, making the events seem less administration, the regulation is likely rational;
devastating than they actually were. Consequently, however, the absence of such a negative impact does
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not mean that the prisoner's right should be
accommodated. These courts have held that,
"[r]ather than allowing prisoners to speculate that
the ripple effect would not be great, the factor allows
prison officials the opportunity to show what impact
accommodating the prisoners' religious principles

procured the pornographic material, they would be
"more than likely to pass their material to other
2 31
prisoners.
Showing certain R-rated films would not
have the same "ripple effect.' Presumably, before
showing R-rated films, prison officials would make
2
23
might have on their prisons'
Turner does not an independent determination that the films did not
phrase this factor as an additional burden on the encourage violent, sexual, or other anti-social
state, but as an element which, if proven, should lead behavior. However, if prison officials did determine
to greater deference to the prison policy.Y4
that a film was not suitable for a particular inmate,
Indeed, in Turner, the Supreme Court did they could simply prevent him from attending the
acknowledge that, "[w]hen accommodation of an screening. Unlike in Waterman, the inmates in Wolf
asserted right will have a significant'ripple effect' on are not asking to possess the material (i.e. by
fellow inmates or on prison staff, courts should be receiving a videotape); they are simply asking that
particularly deferential to the informed discretion specific films be shown. As long as prison officials
of corrections officials: '22s Conversely, the Turner deny access to prisoners they feel should not see
Court also recognized that only rare changes will certain films, the prisoners will not be exposed to
have no impact on the rights of others or prison any dangerous material. Additionally, prison officials
resources.2 26 Based on this language, other courts do not need to work harder to maintain security to
have found that the state cannot prove a prison policy prevent the acquisition of file copies by ineligible

is constitutional merely
by
showing
that
accommodation will
2
cause any impact.
Similarly, the Seventh

27

Circuit has held that
obvious
"[t]he
implication ... is that a
prison may not restrict
a prisoner's rights
without even looking to
a
see how the rights might
be accommodated and
estimating the expense
entailed in doing So"221 In line with these cases, even
a cursory review of the Zimmer Amendment and
the Pennsylvania policy makes it evident that there
would be no negative "ripple effect" by
accommodating the right of prisoners to see certain
R,X, or NC- 17 rated movies.
As previously noted, accommodation of a
right can have a"ripple effect" by negatively impacting
other prisoners or by making the jobs of prison
officials more difficult. An example of the former
effect was found in Waterman v. Farmer. 29 In Farmer,
theThird Circuit upheld a regulation on pornographic
materials, reasoning that the alternative, a limited
distribution to certain offenders determined not to
be sexually deviant, would be ineffective because of
the"ripple effect' 230 The court felt this "ripple effect"
would be inevitable because, once the initial prisoners

prisoners because the issue is simply the screening,
not the possession, of films. Consider the previously
cited Ninth Circuit opinion in Morrison v. Hall.232 In
Hall, the Ninth Circuit looked at the potential danger
that prisoners might receive illegal contraband in
different types of mail.2 33 This concern does not exist

when prisoners are merely viewing movies.

Courts have been extremely reluctant to find
alternatives to prison policies that achieve the same
penological interests without imposing additional
burdens on prison officials. In Amatel v. Reno,3 4 for
instance, the D.C. Circuit upheld a ban on the use of
Bureau of Prisons resources to purchase sexually
explicit material for inmates.23 1 In considering Turners
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fourth factor, the D.C. Circuit held that "[t]he most
obvious alternative is a detailed prisoner-by-prisoner
(and presumably publication by publication) sifting
to determine whether a particular publication will
harm the rehabilitation of a particular prisoner. The

Additionally, several alternative ratings
systems exist that prisons could easily use and that
are more descriptive than the MPAA ratings. For
example, the Film Advisory Board (FAB) issues film
ratings closely analogous to the MPAA ratings. The
'236
costs of this approach seem far from de minimus'.
Board was created in 1988 after independent video
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit dismissed a First producers asked for a more descriptive film rating
Amendment challenge to inmate hair-grooming alternative than the MPAA.24' The FAB, like the MPAA,
regulations.1 37 The Court made clear that an reviews all released movies, but it states explicitly
alternative policy is sufficient only if it is equally why films receive a certain rating, as opposed to the
effective when compared to the original policy,stating clandestine decision-making process of the MPAA 42
that "we can imagine means of achieving the prison's While the MPAA now does include some content
stated goals with less restraint on the prisoner's descriptions, the FAB ratings are much more
rights. Nevertheless, we find it unlikely that all of thorough in describing objectionable material. Prison
the penological interests satisfied by the regulation officials could thus use these ratings to more
could be equally well satisfied by any of the alternatives effectively determine which films they do not want
'
proposed by the prisoners." 38
their prisoners to see.
As far as such a stringent application of the
Another alternative would be the ratings at
fourth factor of Turner is concerned, the Supreme "Kids-in-Mind" 2 4 3 While the name suggests that the
Court's own analysis in Turnersuggests an alternative ratings are geared to children, the web site's
to prisons' absolute reliance on MPAA ratings when recommendations are not age-specific.44 Instead, the
censoring certain films. Recall that in Turnerthe Court site assigns three separate ratings for (I) sex and
4
struck down a marriage regulation "permit [ting] an nudity, (2) violence and gore, and (3) profanity.
inmate to marry only with the permission of the Each of these categories receives a rating between
superintendent of the prison," even in light of the zero and ten based on quantity and context. 46 This
fact that to do so the superintendent had to present system would provide prison officials with much
compelling reasons. 39 The Court found the policy more detailed information than is provided by the
unconstitutional, in part because of an available MPAA ratings about whether a film has objectionable
alternative policy which generally permitted elements. The ratings systems of FAB and Kids-inmarriages, unless "[the] warden finds that it presents Mind are just two examples of a variety of rating
a threat to security or order of [the] institution, or systems that prison officials could use in lieu of MPAA
247
to public safety."24 ° Clearly, this alternative policy ratings.
required wardens to spend more time analyzing each
potential marriage; however, under the alternative
policy the Court shifted the presumption towards
marriage by requiring valid reasons for its prohibition.
While the Third Circuit has rejected a
In the case of movies, a similar or even less
common
sense approach to the Pennsylvania prison
intrusive alternative could be developed. As in Turner,
the presumption could shift in favor of allowing any policy and the Zimmer Amendment,2 48 the District
films to be screened, and the warden - perhaps Court for the District of Columbia came to the
relying on the MPAA ratings and other factors - opposite conclusion in Kimberlin v. United States
would have to present affirmative reasons for why Department ofJustice.2 4 This opinion is a departure
particular films should be censored. Alternatively, from the District Court's previous mirroring of the
the presumption against R, X, and NC- 17 movies Third Circuit's approach to Turner.5
Specifically,the court in Kimberlin upheld the
could remain intact as long as an appeals process
was in place. Thus, the warden could censor films constitutionality of a provision of the Zimmer
based on their MPAA rating, but prisoners would Amendment prohibiting the expenditure of federal
have the opportunity to argue that some films have funds to purchase electric and electronic instruments
sufficient educational merit and lack the for federal prisoners.2 1 The court found that,"[w]hile
banning musical instruments by itself,may not actually
objectionable material prisons want to prohibit.
deter anyone [from committing a crime], it is possible

that [the Bureau of Prisons] BOP (and Congress)
thought the ban would indicate to society that prison
is a harsh place where one does not want to be ' 2
The court concluded that even though it was
optimistic to believe that excluding these instruments
would have any impact, it was not necessarily
3
irrational3

The court misses the point. The ban on
electric instruments or any of the provisions of the
ZimmerAmendment likely do make prison a harsher
place. However, the dispositive question is whether
potential prisoners will be deterred from committing
crimes because of fewer amenities available in prison.
Perhaps it was appropriate in Amatel to use a
common
sense
approach because of
valid reasons for
S -precluding sexually
deviant offenders from
obtaining pornography.
However, as Judge

Rendell noted in Wolf,
whether
amenity
prohibitions in prison
deter
potential
criminals is a much

more difficult social
science question and
requires factual findings.

If this indeed was Congress's intent when
passing the ZimmerAmendment, it makes little sense.
If potential criminals would not be deterred from
committing crimes because they know that musical
instruments are banned from prison, there is no
reason that they will be deterred by the general
prospect that the prison environment has become
less pleasant. Clearly, the court is not persuaded by
the argument that a potential criminal would be
deterred because his musical talents would be
stunted while in prison. But, the court has apparently
accepted the argument that a potential criminal might
be dissuaded from committing a crime by
remembering that electric instruments are banned
from prison, making prison a"harsh place" he needs
to avoid.
These are tenuous arguments, yet the court
urges acceptance of the latter based on "common
sense."254 According to his reading of Amatel, Sullivan
argued that a court can find a rational link between
a prison policy and a governmental interest based
on "common sense" without having to rely on record
evidence. 5 Yet Congress passed the Zimmer
Amendment"without fact finding or consulting with
prison officials and administrators '"2 6 Apparently
using common sense, Sullivan simply concluded that
because "the policy deprives plaintiffs of electrical
instruments as a comfort and amenity, the prison is
25 7
somewhat harsher."

The court in Kimberlin also improperly found
that accommodation would have a negative effect
on prison officials solely because the Bureau Of
Prisons ("BOP") "argue[d] that it [could not]
accommodate plaintiffs without contravening the
Amendment's legitimate purpose of making prisons
more of a deterrent." ' 8 If the penological interests
of the prison are served by abrogating a particular
right, then accommodating that right will mean the
prison cannot fully achieve its interest. The BOP's
argument would thus make Turner's third factor a
tautology.
The real purpose of Turner's third factor,
however, is to determine whether accommodation
of the right would also have a"ripple effect," While
accommodation of the right in Kimberlin might
indirectly have resulted in prison overpopulation,
there were no arguments presented as to why
introducing electronic instruments into prisons
would cause any harm beyond making the prison
environment less harsh. In other words, the BOP
never stated that allowing prisoners to have
electronic instruments would directly lead to any
negative consequences in prison. Similarly, nobody
has presented the similar argument that allowing
prisoners to view R,X, or NC- 17 rated films would
directly lead to any negative consequences.
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Courts are currently at an impasse when
dealing with prisoners' rights cases and the MPAA
ratings. Federal courts had been moving toward a
more active role in vindicating prisoners' rights
before the Supreme Court's decision in Turner. After
Turner, the question remains whether there is any
significant role for federal courts to play in reviewing
prison policies.
The ZimmerAmendment and prison policies
resulting from it have presented federal courts with
the opportunity to apply a stronger standard of
review to prison policies. The provisions of the
Amendment made prison conditions harsher for
prisoners, yet there are no legislative findings that
toughening the prison environment actually deters
potential criminals. When reviewing theAmendment,
district courts in D.C. and Pennsylvania have upheld
the provisions based on a deferential "common
sense" approach. By remanding Wolf v.Ashcroft the
Third Circuit has expressed its preference that
prisons and Congress use a standard more protective
of prisoners. The district court should now take
advantage of this opportunity by finding that the
Pennsylvania prison policy impermissibly relied on
the MPAA ratings in censoring films because the
MPAA ratings should not be used to ground a rational
basis between prison policy and the state's interest.
Courts are also at an impasse in deciding
the legal enforceability of the MPAA ratings.
Previously, courts have found the ratings to be
completely amorphous and legally unenforceable.
Now, courts have held that schools and courts may
completely defer to CARA and the MPAA when
censoring films. If courts continue to allow
governmental agencies to rely upon MPAA ratings
when censoring films, courts will be giving too much
power to the MPAA, a private organization, to inform
government censorship decisions based on nebulous
standards. This use was not historically intended by
the MPAA and is not justified. In essence, unless the
Zimmer Amendment is found unconstitutional, a
private organization will be allowed to decide what
films can and cannot be seen by the American public.
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The MPAA describes its ratings as follows:
G:"General Audiences-All Ages
Admitted."
This is a film which contains nothing in
theme, language, nudity and sex, violence,
etc. which would, in the view of the
Rating Board, be offensive to parents
whose younger children view the film.The
G rating is not a "certificate of approval,"
nor does it signify a children's film.
Some snippets of language may go beyond
polite conversation but they are common
everyday expressions. No stronger words
are present in G-rated films.The violence
is at a minimum. Nudity and sex scenes
are not present; nor is there any drug use
content.
PG:"Parental Guidance Suggested. Some
Material May Not Be Suitable For
Children."
This is a film which clearly needs to be
examined or inquired into by parents
before they let their children attend.The
label PG plainly states that parents may
consider some material unsuitable for
their children, but the parent must make
the decision.
Parents are warned against sending their
children, unseen and without inquiry, to
PG-rated movies.
The theme of a PG-rated film may itself
call for parental guidance.There may be
some profanity in these films.There may
be some violence or brief nudity. But
these elements are not deemed so
intense as to require that parents be
strongly cautioned beyond the suggestion
of parental guidance.There is no drug use
content in a PG-rated film.
The PG rating, suggesting parental
guidance, is thus an alert for examination
of a film by parents before deciding on its
viewing by their children.
Obviously such a line is difficult to draw.
In our pluralistic society it is not easy to
make judgments without incurring some
disagreement. So long as parents know
they must exercise parental responsibility,
the rating serves as a meaningful guide
and as a warning.

n e:1
PG- 13:"Parents Strongly Cautioned. Some
Material May Be Inappropriate For
Children Under 13."
PG- 13 is thus a sterner warning to
parents to determine for themselves the
attendance in particular of their younger
children as they might consider some
material not suited for them. Parents, by
the rating, are alerted to be very careful
about the attendance of their underteenage children.
A PG- 13 film is one which, in the view of
the Rating Board, leaps beyond the
boundaries of the PG rating in theme,
violence, nudity, sensuality, language, or
other contents, but does not quite fit
within the restricted R category.Any drug
use content will initially require at least a
PG- 13 rating. In effect, the PG- 13
cautions parents with more stringency
than usual to give special attention to this
film before they allow their 12-year olds
and younger to attend.
If nudity is sexually oriented, the film will
generally not be found in the PG- 13
category. If violence is too rough or
persistent, the film goes into the R
(restricted) rating.A film's single use of
one of the harsher sexually-derived
words, though only as an expletive, shall
initially require the Rating Board to issue
that film at least a PG- 13 rating. More
than one such expletive must lead the
Rating Board to issue a film an R rating, as
must even one of these words used in a
sexual context.These films can be rated
less severely, however, if by a special vote,
the Rating Board feels that a lesser rating
would more responsibly reflect the
opinion of American parents.
PG- 13 places larger responsibilities on
parents for their children's moviegoing.
The voluntary rating system is not a
surrogate parent, nor should it be. It
cannot, and should not, insert itself in
family decisions that only parents can, and
should, make. Its purpose is to give
prescreening advance informational
warnings, so that parents can form their
own judgments. PG- 13 is designed to
make these parental decisions easier for
films between PG and R.
R:"Restricted, Under 17 Requires
Accompanying Parent Or Adult
Guardian."
In the opinion of the Rating Board, this
film definitely contains some adult
material. Parents are strongly urged to
find out more about this film before they
allow their children to accompany them.

An R-rated film may include hard
language, or tough violence, or nudity
within sensual scenes, or drug abuse or
other elements, or a combination of
some of the above, so that parents are
counseled, in advance, to take this
advisory rating very seriously. Parents
must find out more about an R-rated
movie before they allow their teenagers
to view it.
NC- 17:"No One 17 And Under
Admitted."
This rating declares that the Rating Board
believes that this is a film that most
parents will consider patently too adult
for their youngsters under 17. No
children will be admitted. NC- 17 does
not necessarily mean "obscene or
pornographic" in the oft-accepted or
legal meaning of those words.The Board
does not and cannot mark films with
those words.These are legal terms and
for courts to decide.The reasons for the
application of an NC- 17 rating can be
violence or sex or aberrational behavior
or drug abuse or any other elements
which, when present, most parents would
consider too strong and therefore offlimits for viewing by their children.
Motion Picture Association of America, How it
Works, at http://www.mpaa.org/movieratings/about/
contentS.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2004).
has similarly adopted legislation implementing the
Zimmer Amendment. A challenge to that policy will be
addressed infra section IV.f.
4 D.C.

'Jones v. N.C. Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 139
(1977) (Marshall, J.dissenting) (quoting Ruffin v.
Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790,796 (1871))
(alterations in original).
'See Lorijean Golichowski Dei, Note, The New Standard of
Review for Prisoners'Rights: A "Turner'for the Worse, 33 VI LL.L
REV. 393, 399 (1988) (asserting that "[t]he courts' position of
absolute deference to prison officials continued almost
completely uninterrupted until the 1960's when a steady
stream of cases from both state and federal courts signaled a
gradual movement away from the hands-off doctrine").
MICHEL MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 1.02 (2d ed. 1993);
RobertA. Surrette, Drawing the Iron Curtain: Prisoners' Rights
From Morrisey v. Brewer to Sandin v. Conner,72 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 923,924 (1997). There were, however, exceptions to
the hands-off doctrine. See, e.g., Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d
443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944) (holding that "[a] prisoner retains all
the rights of an ordinary citizen except those expressly, or by
necessary implication, taken from him by law"). The Supreme
Court would eventually incorporate this language into its
"retained rights" doctrine. See infra note 30 and
accompanying text.
7

SL M , T
8

MUSHLIN,

supra note 7, at §1.02

101 F Supp. 285 (D.Alaska 1951).
0

Id. at 286-87.

'1Id. at 287.
12Id. at 290. The Court even recognized that its decision was
simply based on courts' historically not intervening in prison
cases rather than any individualized judgment about the
circumstances of the case before it. See id. (basing its decision
on the fact that "the life of the law has been not in logic but
experience").

24

Cheryl Dunn Giles, Note,Turner v. Safley and its Progeny:A
Gradual Retreat to the "Hands-Off" Doctrine?,35 ARiz. L REV.
219, 222 (1993).
2' See MUSHLIN, supra note 7, at §1.03 (stating that "prisoners
were becoming increasingly militant and assertive").
26

1963).
27

MUSHLIN,

supra note 7, at § 1.03.

28

Wolff v.McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,555-56 (1974).

29

Surrette, supra note 7, at 924. Separation of powers was
relevant because "[t]he management and control of prisons
are generally viewed as executive and legislative functions.
That courts should tell these co-equal branches of
government how to run their penal institutions was
troublesome:' MUSHLIN, supra note 7, at §1.02 Because many
of the cases in federal courts were brought by state
prisoners, federalism was also a concern. "Federal courts
expressed the concern that, by adjudicating these claims in a
way that was favorable to inmates, they would be using
federal power to dictate to the states how to run their own
institutions." Id.
Courts cited judicial incompetence because of "the
assumption that the management of prison requires
considerable skill, training, and experience." Id. judges
consequently feared that reviewing prison policies would
concomitantly minimize their authority. Finally, the fear of'a
flood of litigation' resulted from the "large number of
inmates potentially willing to present their complaints, and
[the] large variety of claims that might be pressed..." Id.

Id;
see, e.g., Pierce v. LaVallee, 319 F.2d 844,844 (2d Cir.

Id.
at 555.

1

4
S Surrette,

30417 U.S. 817 (1974).

11See GORDON HAWKINS,THE

PRISON: POLICY AND PRACTICE 135
(1976); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,422-23 (1974)
(MarshallJ., concurring).

32Martinez, 416 U.S. at 422-23 (Marshall, J., concurring)

(quoting Coffin v. Reichard, 143 E2d 443,445 (6th Cir. 1944)).
That same year,a majority of the Court endorsed Marshall's
view in Pellv.Procunier,417 U.S.817 (1974). Specifically,the
Court held that "a prison inmate retains those rights that are
not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the
legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system."
Id. at 822.
3 MUSHLIN,
34416

supra note 7, at §1.04 (citing Pell, 417 U.S. at 822).

U.S. 396 (1974).

35

Giles, supra note 24, at 222.

supra note 7 at 924.
36 Martinez, 416 U.S. at 398. The guiding principle behind this

13ld.
6
Section 1983 provides, in part, that "[e]very person who,
under color of any statute, ordinance, [or] regulation.. .of any
State.. .subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States.. .to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law...." 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (2000).
17365

U.S. 167 (1961).

regulation was "that personal correspondence by prisoners is
'a privilege, not a right."' Id.
17

d. at 419

38Id. at 408

(holding that,"[w]hatever the status of a
prisoner's claim to uncensored correspondence with an
outsider, it is plain that the latter's interest is grounded in the
First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech:').

'9Dei, supra note 6, at 402.

"ISee id. at 413 (requiring that the regulations "further an
important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to
the suppression of expression" and that their "limitation of
First Amendment freedoms...be no greater than is
necessary....").

20378 U.S. 546 (1964).

40417

21Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546, 546 (1964).

41Id. at

aId. at 183; see also Dei, supra note 6, at 401-02.

221d.
23

Id.

U.S. 817 (1974).

83 1. The regulation simultaneously prohibited free
access for journalists to interview inmates and limited
prisoner's ability to initiate interviews with the press. Id. at
827,831.
42 Id. at

834. And, under the regulation, journalists were

treated no differently than the general public. See id.

A

Vo

~

f

"tj

-C

43

test makes it "too easy to uphold restrictions on
prisoners'...rights..."); Dei, supra note 6, at 236 (stating that
the new test is "excessively deferential"); Giles, supra note 24,
at 236 (asserting that "one test is not adequate to fully
accommodate the assertion of all possible inmate rights").

1Id. at 826.

41 Id. at 823-28.
4SId.

Press Release, Office of U.S. Rep. Dick Zimmer, Legislation
to End Prison Perks Wins Endorsements, (Jan. 31, 1995),
available at http://www.strengthtech.com/correct/laws/
federal/luxurypr.htm (last visited Feb. 29, 2004).

482 U.S. 78 (1987).
47

See, e.g., Jones v. N.C. Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S.
119, 130-33 (1977);Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56
(1974); Dei, supra note 6, at 408-14.

10Pub. L. No. 107-77, 115 Stat. 748 (2001 ).

1 Dei, supra note 6, at 414-17 (discussing several cases where
lower federal courts applied different tests).
49482

Kimberlin v. U.S. Dep't of justice, 150 F Supp.2d 36, 38 (D.

6

D.C. 2001).
U.S. 78 (1987); Dei, supra note 6, at 417.

62Id. at 39 (quoting 141 CONG. REC. H7751-01 (1995))

s Turner,482 U.S. at 78.

(emphasis in original).

s' Id. at 81-82 (quoting the prison regulation).

6

52Id. at

82 (quoting the prison regulation).

Id. at 89. The Court explicitly rejected the strict scrutiny
standard established in Procunier v. Martinez, holding that
"[s]ubjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to
an inflexible strict scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper
their ability to anticipate security problems and to adopt
innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prison
administration." Id.
1

Press Release, Office of U.S. Rep. Dick Zimmer, Zimmer's

Ban on Prison Perks Approved in House, (Feb. 9, 1995),
available at http://www.strengthtech.com/correct/laws/
federal/luxurypr.htm (last visited Feb. 29, 2004).
Press Release, Office of U.S. Rep. Dick Zimmer, Close the
Door on Federal "Glamour Slammers," (Feb. 9, 1995),
available at http://www.strengthtech.com/correct/laws/
federal/luxurypr.htm (last visited Feb. 29, 2004).
'4

6

Wolf v.Ashcroft, 297 F.3d 305, 307 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting

Program Statement 5370).

Id. at 89-90 (internal citations omitted).

66Shannon

11Id. at 93. The regulation promoted security because
"[p]rison officials.. .stated that in their expert opinion,
correspondence between prison institutions facilitates the
development of informal organizations that threaten the core
functions of prison administration..." Id. at 92. It was not an
exaggerated response because there were no ready
alternatives for prison officials. Those "officials testified that
it would be impossible to read every piece of inmate-toinmate correspondence, and consequently there would be an
appreciable risk of missing dangerous messages." Id. at 93
(internal citation omitted).
56Id. at

P.Duffys Case Remanded forApplication of Turner Test

LEGAL INTELLIGENCER,

July 25, 2003, at 3.

7

6 Wolf,297 F3d at 307;Adam Liptak, Appeals Court Reinstates

Suit by Inmates Over Films Rated R,N.Y.TIMES,July 28,2002, at
23.
63

Duffy, supra note 66.

69

Wolf 297 F3d at 308

70

td.

7i

Id.

98-99. One interest proffered by the state in denying

many marriages was that "women prisoners needed to
concentrate on developing skills of self-reliance...:' Id.at 97.
The Court found this purported interest suspect because
"only one [marriage had been] refused on the basis of
fostering excessive dependency.' Id. at 99. The Court also
found that the prohibition swept too broadly because
"[t]here [we]re obvious, easy alternatives to the Missouri
regulation" such as a policy where marriages are "generally
permitted, but not if [the] warden finds that it presents a
threat to security or order of [the] institution, or to public
safety" Id. at 98.
7
0'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 356 (1987)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).

" See id.; Turner, 482 U.S. at 100-01 (Stevens,J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the Court's new

73

d.

- 183 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 1999).
71Whereas the prisoners challenged the constitutionality of

the Zimmer Amendment and the prison's policy in District
Court,"on appeal the prisoners attack[ed] only the policy."
Id. at 307.
76 Id. at

308. The government had already admitted that the

policy impinged on the prisoners' right because it prevented
them from viewing certain films while they were allowed to
view others.

286

~i V
I Wolf, 297 F.3d at 308.
78

79

Id. at 309.

106

LEWIS, supra note 88, at 89.

Id.

1

07

Mosk, supra note 98, at 135.

80Id.

Rendell stressed that McLaughlin's "ruling turned

8

105Id.

exclusively on Turner's first factor" Id.
82 Id.

"°TheCode was "named afterWill Hayes, the first President
of the MPP[DA]." Id.
""Jacob Septimus, The NPAA Ratings System: A Regime of
Private Censorship and Cultural Manipulation, 21 COLUM-VLA J.L.
&ARTS 69, 71 (1996).

8 Duffy, supra note 66.
110 Id.

Wolf,297 F3d at 309-3 10 (quoting Shaw v. Murphy,
532 U.S. 223,229-230 (2001)).

Id.
2

' Mosk, supra note 98, at 135.

8

- Id. at 309.
H3 Septimus, supra note 109, at 7 1.

86

Id. at 3 10.
114

Mosk, supra note 98.

"1

LEWIS, supra note 89, at 89.

87 Id.
11Kinetoscopes

were "early short films featur[ing] sporting
events, circus acts, and scantily clad women often depicted
dancing or posing by the beach." JON LEWIS, HOLLYWOOD V.
HARDCORE: How THE STRUGGLE OVER CENSORSHIP SAVED THE

MODERN FILM INDUSTRY 328 n. I (2000).
89

Id. at 86.

90

Id. at 87.

11633 U.S. 131 (1948)
7

1

Paramount 33 U.S.at 166.

"' Mosk, supra note 98.
"9

LEWIS, supra note 88, at 127.

120Id.

91Id.

21

'

Id. at 127, 129.

22

Id. at 129.

92Id.
93/d

11 Id. at 128.
94

Id. at 88.
124d.

95

Id.

96

Id.

"I Id. at 135.
126390
97

Id.
27

98

Richard M. Mosk, Symposium, Motion Picture Ratings in the

United States, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. LJ. 135,135 (1997).
99

LEWIS, supra note 88, at 89. "Some cities were strict but
consistent; others, like Chicago, were decidedly erratic!" Id.

U.S. 629 (1968).

Id. at 630.

12" LEWIS, supra note 88, at 140 (emphasis in original); see also

Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 636 (holding that "the concept of
obscenity or of unprotected matter may vary according to
the group to whom the questionable material is directed or
from whom it is quarantined").

00

1 Id.
'29390

U.S. 676 (1968).

01

1 Id.

30

Id. at 682.

02236 U.S. 230 (1915).
131

Id. at 689.

32

Id. at 690.

103Id. at 240.
04

1

Id. at 244.
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133

Septimus, supra note 109, at 72.

1 Id.

114

Mosk, supra note 98, at 136.

'-8

.

..

57

Id. at 826.

"' Id. (emphasis added).

111
Septimus, supra note 109, at 7 1.

160317 F.Supp. 1133 (E.D.Wis. 1970).
37

jackValenti, The Movie Rating System, reprinted in Swope v.
Lubbers, 560 ESupp. 1328, app. at 1335 (D. Mich. 1983).

"IId. at 1134.
2

16

Id. (quoting KENOSHA CODE OF GENERAL ORDINANCES

138Id.

§11.11 I-A-2 (1970)).

I"9 LEwis, supra note 88, at 140.

163 Id. at 1135.

4 Mosk, supra note 98, at 136-37.

1

Id.

'61

Eastern Fed. Corp. v.Wasson, 316 S.E.2d 373 (1984).

64

41
JackValenti, Personal Statement (1968) (on file
with author).

166Id. at

42

JackValenti, The Movie Rating System, reprinted in Swope v.
Lubbers, 560 F Supp. 1328, app. at 1335 (D. Mich. 1983).

452.

1

143

117888 F.Supp. 97 (E.D.Wisc. 1995).
6

LEwIs, supra note 88, at 14 1.

'44JackValenti, The Movie Rating System, reprinted in Swope v.
Lubbers, 560 F Supp. 1328, app. at 1335 (D. Mich. 1983).
145Id.
46

1 1d. at 1338.

Id. at 1337-38. The original rating system included X and
M (Mature) ratings and did not include the PG, PG- 13 and
NC- 17 ratings. The NC- 17 rating eventually replaced the X
rating, the PG rating eventually replaced the M rating, and the
PG- 13 rating was added in the 1980s in response to movies
such as "Gremlins" and "Indiana Jones and the Temple of
Doom."

I Id. at 98.

"6 ' Id. The relevant part of the policy states that"No films
having a rating of R,NC 17,orX shall be shown to students at
any school.' Id. (quoting KENOSHA SCHOOL DISTRICT POLICY §
616 1.11) (emphasis in original). The court thus properly
found that,"when determining which films may be shown in
school, the School District relies on the ratings established
by the voluntary movie rating system of the... MPAA...." Id.

141

170Id. at 99.
171 Id.

72

3

17

Id. at 1337-38. The original rating system included X and
M (Mature) ratings and did not include the PG, PG- 13 and
NC- 17 ratings. The NC- 17 rating eventually replaced the X
rating, the PG rating eventually replaced the M rating, and the
PG- 13 rating was added in the 1980s in response to movies
such as "Gremlins" and "Indiana Jones and the Temple of
Doom."

Id. at 100.
Id.

148

174 Id.

175

76

1

Id.

Id. at 100-0 1.

7 See infra note 148.
49

1

Id. at 1337.
178Of

5

'

o Id. at 1338.
'

Swope, 560 F Supp. at 1339.

course, there is also the question of whether the
Amendment's reliance constitutes an impermissible
delegation of authority and violation of the separation of
powers. However, because this issue was not before the
court in Wolf,it will not be discussed in further detail.

12Id.

179Scott
153

Mosk, supra note 99, at 137.

5

315 F.Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1970).

i55 Id.
16 Id. at 825

v. Mississippi Dep't of Corrections, 961 F2d 77, 80-

81 (6th Cir. 1992).
"I Wolf v.Ashcroft, 297 F.3d 305 n.5 (3rd Cir. 2002)
(emphasis in original).
'I Id. at 310.

"2Waterman v. Farmer, 183 F.3d 208, 213-14 (3' Cir. 1999)
(quotingAmatel v. Reno, 156 F.3d 192,196 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).

28 F3d 592 (7" Cir. 1994); Scott v. Mississippi Dep't of
Corrections, 961 F2d 77,80-81 (61h Cir. 1992).

83See

Thornburgh v.Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 417 (1989) (construing
Turner and O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987)).
In Turner, the Court viewed the right expansively as the right
of expression; consequently, it "did not require that prisoners
be afforded other means of communicating with inmates at
other institutions...." Id. Thus, the second factor was
satisfied solely because "other means of expression (not
necessarily other means of communicating with inmates in
other prisons) remained available...." Id.
Similarly, in O'Lone, the Court did not "require that there
be alternative means of attending the Jumu'ah religious
ceremony." Id. (internal citation omitted). Instead of defining
the right narrowly as the right to attend this specific
ceremony, the Court looked broadly at the right to the free
exercise of religion and found this factor satisfied because
the "prisoners were permitted to participate in other Muslim
religious ceremonies." Id.

supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text. But see
Scott v. Mississippi Dep't of Corrections, 961 F2d 77, 81 (5th
Cir. 1992) (holding that "[flactor one is simply a restatement
of rationality review....As we have said, this is the controlling
question posed by these cases; the other factors merely help
a court determine if the connection is logical").
"'This standard is similar to rational-basis review, under
which a statutory classification can be declared
unconstitutional only where the relationship of the
classification to the asserted goal is 'so attenuated as to
render the distinction arbitrary or irrational.' Waterman, 183
F3d at 215.
185261 F3d 896 (9-' Cir. 200 1).
' 6Id. at 902.
187

Id

"I Id. at 902.

20'

2

/Id.at 403.

23

1d. at 418.

O482 U.S. 342 (1987).
"0Morrison v. Hall, 261 F3d 896,903 (9th Cir. 2001).

205

Id.

'9' Kerby Anderson, Film Study, at http://www.probe.org/docs/
c-film.html (last visited Feb. 29, 2004). The study was
conducted by "U.C. Irvine economics professor Arthur
DeVany" and reviewed the grosses of "2015 movies released
between 1985 and 1996." Id.

2

192Id.

29

Amatel v. Reno, 156 F3d 192,201 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

20

Id.

2

Thornburgh v.Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989).

21

Id at 403.

'9 The government also cited security as an interest served
by banning R, X, and NC- 17 films. Because prisoners would
only be viewing these films and not receiving videotapes, it is
difficult to see how this interest is relevant. Unlike in cases
involving incoming mail, there is no danger here that allowing
prisoners to merely view movies could potentially result in
the introduction of illegal contraband into the prison. Any
other security concern would likely be too attenuated to be
relevant.
14 Swope v. Lubbers, 560 F Supp. 1328, 1337 (W.D. Mich.
1983).
'"

"o Id. at 352.

20

7 Id.

8

20 Id.

211

2

Id. at 405.
Id. at 416, 417 n. IS.

215 28
216

F3d 592 (7th Cir. 1994).

/d.at 598.

Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,90 (1987).
217 id

96286 F.3d 311 (6th Cir. 2002).
118261 F3d 896 (9th Cir. 2001).
97

1

Id. at 320.

198Id.
99Id.
2

0oThornburgh v.Abbott, 490 U.S. 401,417 ( 1989);Amatel v.

Reno, 156 F3d 192,201 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Kikumura v.Turner,

219Id. at 904 (holding that, "[a]lthough radio and television are
alternative media by which inmates may receive information
about the 'outside' world, they should not be considered a
substitute for reading newspapers and magazines").

2" Id.at n.7 (noting that,"[a]ccording to The LosAngeles Times,
the 1992 National adult Literacy Survey'found that twothirds of adult prisoners were not able to write a letter

~r

~

explaining a billing error or extract information from the
average sports-page story").
This presumption is supported by the fact that the
majority of films winning the Oscar for Best Picture since the
advent of the MPAA ratings have been historical dramas
rated R.
22!

222
Scott v.Mississippi Dep't of Corrections, 961 F.2d 77, 8081 (6th Cir. 1992) (interpreting the Court's holding in Turner).
223

Id. at 81.

224

ld. at 81 n.17.

12 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,90 (1987).
This is because of "the necessarily closed environment
correctional institution... Id.
the
of
226Id.

227
Beerhide v. Suthers, 286 F3d 1179, 1190 (10th Cir. 2002).

n"Kikumura v.Turner, 28 F.3d 592, 599 (7th Cir. 1994).
229183 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 1999).
230

Id. at 219-20.

231Id. at 219.
232261 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 200 1).
133

Id. at 902.

234 156

F3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

7

Kids-In-Mind,The Idea Behind Our Rating System, at http:/
/www.kids-in-mind.com/help/methodology.htm (last visited
Feb. 29, 2004).
244

245

2 46

Id.

Id.

247

Another example is http://psvratings.com, where films are
rated on different indices based on their profanity, sexual
content, and violence. See PSVRatings, PSVRatings FAQs, at
http://psvratings.com/FAQs.html (last visited Feb. 29,2004).
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8 See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
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For instance, in Waterman v. Farmer, the Third Circuit

cited with approval the District Court for the District of
Columbia's decision in Amatel v. Reno several times. 183 F.3d
208, 212, 214,215,217, 218, 219 (3d Cir. 1999).
25 Kimberlin, 150 E Supp.2d at 38. The court did find

unconstitutional on equal protection grounds an exception
to the Zimmer Amendment for funding for such instruments
for religious uses. Id. at 48-50.
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24!Film Advisory Board, FAB Rating System, available at http://

www.filmadvisoryboard.org/ratings/Default.asp (last visited
Feb. 29,2004).
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"if there are components of gratuitous violence,
sex, nudity, substance abuse, etc., the FAB rating so advises,
so you can make an informed choice in selecting
entertainment...." Film Advisory Board,About FAB, at http://
www.filmadvisoryboard.org/about/Default.asp (last visited
Feb. 29, 2004).
243Kids-In-Mind, Movie Ratings That Actually Work, at http://

www.kids-in-mind.com (last visited Feb. 29, 2004).
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